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Abstract 
This paper provides cross-country evidence on the relationship between immigration-induced diversity and 
economic performance, as evaluated by the Economic Fitness metric. To address endogeneity concerns, we 
use gravity-based predictors of migrant diversity as a source of exogenous variation. We show that migration 
induces a sizable positive effect on the counties’ Fitness. These findings appear to stem from migrants into 
middle-income counties. Our results are robust to the use of data from alternative sources, estimation 
methods, and an extensive set of contemporaneous and historical controls. Importantly, we establish the 
validity of the results using a time-varying instrument and conventional panel data regressions. 
 
 




National statistics show that international migration has risen rapidly over the past 
decades (Özden et al., 2011). As a result, a substantial fraction of the workforce worldwide 
are immigrants.12 These developments have sparked a wealth of economics literature, 
mainly exploring the effects of immigrants on the wages of natives (see, among many 
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1 According to the latest available data, foreign-born individuals amount to about 271.5 million (United Nations, 2019). 
2 In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global recession, mass migration coincided with the electoral success of far -right 
populist parties. As summarized in Rodrik (2020), a growing number of empirical studies have established a causal 
linkage between these trends. 
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others, Altonji and Card, 1991, Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012).3 More recent 
studies, however, have taken a broader perspective by looking at the interplay between 
migration and economic performance at the macro level (see e.g., Felbermayr et al. 2010; 
Ortega and Peri, 2014; Alesina et al., 2016; Bove and Elia, 2017; Bahar et al., 2020). 
Nevertheless, more research is needed to understand the role of immigrants in shaping the 
receiving economies.  
Theory suggests that cross-border mobility generates substantial income gains due to 
immigration-induced diversity in skills and ideas (Ortega and Peri, 2014; Alesina et al., 
2016). What is more, international migration is considered to promote development by 
accelerating the diffusion of knowledge (Bosseti et al., 2015; Bahar and Rapoport, 2018). 
The opposite view is that heterogeneous migrations may hamper development by eroding 
social trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007). Furthermore, some scholars 
posit that the effects on host societies may be adverse if migrants undermine institutions, 
conducive to economic growth (see, e.g., Collier, 2013; Borjas, 2015). Recent evidence, 
however, indicates that immigration is unlikely to undermine the institutional environment 
in the receiving economies (see, e.g., Clark et al., 2015; Powell et al., 2017).4  
In this article, we examine the impact of immigrant diversity on the host countries’ 
economic performance, as proxied by the novel Fitness metric, introduced by Tacchella et 
al. (2012; 2013). Fitness provides a quantitative measure of an economic system's 
productive capabilities, based on the concept of economic complexity - the capacity to 
export diversified and less ubiquitous products - introduced by Hausmann et al. (2007); 
Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). As has been consistently shown by these authors and a 
recent growing empirical literature, export sophistication is among the strongest predictors 
of economic growth. However, Tacchella et al. (2012; 2013) recognize that the relationship 
between diversification and ubiquity is not necessarily linear, as has been earlier proposed 
by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), and introduce a non-linear algorithm on the countries’ 
 
3 Edo (2019) provides a summary review of empirical studies on the labor market effects of immigration .  
4 There is, however, some evidence that migration influences political institutions adversely in low-income countries 
(see, Roupakias and Dimou, 2021) 
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Fitness and products’ complexity.5 In addition, as can be seen in Figure 2, which depicts 
cross-country patterns on Economic Fitness, advanced economies in  Western  Europe and  
Northern  America tend to be more ”Fit” as compared to the rest of the world. China and 
India also display a noteworthy performance. At the same time, the bottom part of this 
figure suggests that these economies also tend to be more multi-ethnic, as they attract 
immigrants from a vast array of source countries and cultures. Hence, these preliminary 
observations imply that it is of particular importance to examine whether migration matters 
for the comparative Fitness of the destination countries. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The most related previous studies to ours are Bahar et al. (2020) and Alesina et al. 
(2016), who have focused on the cross-country effects of birthplace diversity on Hidalgo 
and Hausmann’s (2009) economic complexity metric and income per person, 
respectively.67  Both studies have found a positive immigrant contribution to a large cross-
section of countries. The main departure of our approach with respect to Bahar et al (2020) 
is that we consider the Economic Fitness metric that, though not immune to criticism, is 
probably the best among the complexity indicators (see, e.g., Pietronero et al., 2017; Liao 
and Vidmer, 2018). In addition, we also recur to conventional panel data estimates, 
following the method introduced by Feyrer (2019). Our findings also lend support to the 
evidence reported in Alesina et al. (2016), highlighting the potential role of immigrant 
diversity on a country’s competitiveness and complexity . Our paper is also related to 
Ortega and Peri (2014), who study the effects of openness to trade and immigration on 
economic development. Interestingly, they find that the contribution of immigration is 
 
5 These authors also argue that Economic Fitness even outperforms International Monetary Fund’s more sophisticated 
approach at predicting economic growth. 
6 There is also a growing literature looking at the effects of immigrant diversity at the regional level (e.g., Ottaviano and 
Peri, 2006; Ager and Brückner, 2013; Trax et al., 2015; Kemeny and Cooke, 2018; Docquier et al., 2020; Fulford, et al., 
2020) 
7 A closely related study is Valette (2018) who examines the impact of emigrants from developing countries on the 
transmission of productive technology back to their homeland. Using the System GMM estimator, this study conveys 
the message that source countries enjoy large gains in terms of export s ophistication.  
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more significant as compared to trade. The present paper also fits into the literature 
examining the determinants of cross-border mobility by estimating a pseudo-gravity model 
of bilateral migrations (e.g., Mayda, 2010; Grogger and Hanson, 2011). We pursue a 
similar approach, to ease concerns over the validity of our analysis, stemming from the fact 
that the selection of migrants in the receiving countries is unlikely to be random. 
Specifically, we apply an instrumental variables approach, using the gravity-based 
migrations to generate exogenous variation. This identification strategy has recently gained 
wide acceptance among researchers attempting to isolate causal effects of migration  in a 
cross-sectional setting (see, e.g., Felbermayr et al., 2010; Ortega and Peri, 2014; Alesina et 
al., 2016; Bahar et al., 2020). 
We construct a birthplace diversity measure using data from Özden et al. (2011). We put 
special care to minimize the risk of omitted variable bias by employing an extensive set of 
covariates. Following common practice in the literature (see, e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999; 
Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Rodrik et 
al., 2004), our analysis accounts for the roles of geography, institutions, and openness to 
trade. Overall, this paper produces robust evidence that immigrant-induced diversity 
displays a robust positive association with the Fitness of the countries. Our preferred IV 
estimates suggest that a standard deviation increase in our birthplace diversity indicator 
causes Fitness to increase by about 0.4 standard deviations. However, we show that there 
is significant heterogeneity according to the destination countries’ level of development. 
In particular, we find that the contribution of migrants is more pronounced into middle -
income countries. Most importantly, we find supportive evidence once we employ a time-
varying instrument a la Feyrer (2019) within a panel data setting, using data from United 
Nations Migrant Stocks. 
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the data and the 
empirical model used to identify the relationship between immigration and economic 
“fitness”. Section 3 presents the findings of the research, focusing on the 2SLS estimates; 
and performs a battery of robustness checks. Finally, Section 4 draws conclusions. 
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2 Data and Model 
Up until the early 2000s, cross-country analysis of international migrations was bound 
to be limited due to data availability. However, this has been made possible recently thanks 
to several research teams and international institutions (such as the United Nations) that 
have collected and harmonized data from various population records (see, Özden et al., 
2011; Artuc et al., 2015). From Özden et al. (2011) we exploit information on bilateral 
migration for the years 1990 and 2000,8 to construct an indicator on immigrant 
heterogeneity, that is derived as follows (see, e.g., Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Alesina et al, 
2016): 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑐 = 1− ∑(Mcj)2𝑀𝑗=≠c  (1) 
where 𝑀𝑐𝑗 stands for the ratio between the number of immigrants born in country j and 
residing in country c and the total population in country c. The index ranges between 0 and 
1, with greater values denoting more diversity among migrants.9 In addition, we use 
complementary data from Artuc et al (2015), which y the same token, we also investigate 
whether the effects of immigrant diversity are skill-specific using data from. As is common 
in the literature, we simultaneously control for the share of immigrants over the total 
population. For completeness, we also exploit immigration data from a third source, the 
United Nations Migrant Stock Data, that enables us to construct a time-varying diversity 
measure. 
As already discussed in the introduction, our main proxy for economic development is 
the indicator from proposed by Tacchela et al. (2012) (available at: 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/economic-fitness).10  Their approach is based on 
Hausmann et al. (2007) and Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), who argue that the number of 
 
8 The data are available at: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/global-bilateral-migration-database. 
9 The countries with the highest value of diversity are, Denmark, Canada and Norway. At the other end of the spectrum, 
we find countries such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.  
10 For further technical details on the construction of “fitness”, we refer the interest reader to Tacchela et al. (2012). 
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exported products (diversity) and the number of countries exporting each product 
(ubiquity) convey important information about a country’s productive capabilities. 
However, Tachella et al. (2012; 2013) recognize that diversification may be misleading in 
identifying export sophistication in a linear way, and introduce an indicator for countries' 
fitness, F, and products' complexity, Q, that can be summarized according to the following 
iterative approach:  
{   
   𝐹?̃? (𝑛) = ∑𝑀𝑐𝑝𝑄𝑝(𝑛−1)𝑝?̃?𝑐(𝑛) = 1∑ 𝑀𝑐𝑝( 1𝐹𝑝(𝑛−1))𝑝  
→ {  
    𝐹𝑐(𝑛) = ?̃?𝑐(𝑛)〈?̃?𝑐(𝑛)〉𝑐𝑄𝑝(𝑛) = ?̃?𝑝(𝑛)〈?̃?𝑝(𝑛)〉𝑐
(2) 
where the initial conditions are 𝑄𝑝(0) = 0 ∀𝑝 and  𝐹𝑐(0) = 0 ∀𝑐, and M is a binary country-
product that reports whether a country is a net exporter of a product according to Balassa’s 
(1965) criterion of revealed comparative advantage. Within this context, Fitness captures 
the ability of countries to export a diversified basket of complex products, where non-
complex products are those exported by underdeveloped countries.11   
As a check of robustness, we use data from Archibugi and Coco (2004), who propose 
an alternative indicator of technological capabilities, measured along three dimensions: the 
creation of technology, the technological infrastructures, and the development of human 
skills. 
In line with the relevant literature, we also employ an extensive set of control variables 
to reduce concerns on omitted variables bias (see, e.g., Ortega and Peri, 2014; Alesina et 
al., 2016). Specifically, we introduce covariates that capture the level of economic 
development (GDP per capita), country size (population), openness to trade (sum of 
imports and exports normalized by GDP), and resource-richness (a dummy indicating 
 
11 To gain further insights on the relationship between Economic Fitness and economic development, we run a lowess 
nonparametric regression of Fitness on income per person. As it is evident in Appendix Figure A1, there is a non-
monotonic relationship that is mainly driven by energy rich countries, which appear to be less ‘Fit’ f.  
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whether a country is a net exporter of oil or gas).12  Information on income and trade 
openness is drawn from the Penn World Table (PWT)13. Data on population are from the 
World Development Indicators. The oil dummy is computed using data from the latest 
Quality of Government Standard Dataset (QoG). 
We also introduce time-invariant variables, that are similar to those used in several 
mainstream studies (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000; Acemoglu et 
al., 2001; Sachs, 2003) to account for the roles of geographic characteristics (distance from 
the equator, dummy for being landlocked, distance to the nearest coastline, the percentage 
of land area in tropics, land area in sq. km), disease and climate environment (malaria and 
yellow fever indicators, mean temperature and precipitation over the 1960-1990 period), 
dummy indicators for former European colonies, and continent/year fixed effects to 
capture unobserved heterogeneity. Notice, that, as in Ortega and Peri (2014), the variable 
distance from the equator serves as an exogenous proxy for a country’s institutional 
development. This choice is motivated by Hall and Jones (1999) who argue that as 
Europeans in the 1500s tended to settle in areas farther from the equator, contemporary 
institutional performance must be related to this geographic characteristic due to 
persistence. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Hence, to identify the effects of diversity on economic fitness, we estimate the following 
empirical model: 𝐸𝑐𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐,𝑡−5+ γ𝑿𝑐,𝑡 +𝛾𝑖 +𝜑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑡   (3) 
where the dependent variable Ecfit is an indicator of productive capabilities in country 
c; Diversity is our main independent variable of interest that captures birthplace diversity 
among immigrants, and 𝑿 is a vector of the explanatory variables that were described 
above. Except for the migrant diversity and the immigrant share, all variables are measured 
 
12 See Table 1 for a detailed description of data and sources.  
13 In particular, we use variables rgdpl and openc from Penn World Tables (7.0) 
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in years 1995 and 2005. To quantify the association between migration and the Fitness of 
countries, we standardize the dependent variable as well as the main independent variables 
(i.e., the migrant diversity and the immigrant share). In robustness checks, we further 
expand the set of controls by including average years of schooling from the Wittgenstein 
Centre Human Capital Data Explorer, institutions (Polity IV's polity2 index, and the 
average value of the World Governance Indicators), real trade openness in the spirit of 
Alcalá and Ciccone, 2004), the KOF globalization index, and population density in 
1500CE. 
However, the OLS estimate of 𝛽 in equation (3) would be spurious either due to reverse 
causality issues or due to unobserved confounding, i.e., co-determinants of Fitness and 
diversity. It might also be the case of noisy data if (undocumented) migrants are 
underreported in population records. To mitigate these endogeneity and measurement error 
concerns, we use predicted diversity as a source of exogenous variation, generated by a 
gravity approach, quite similar to Ortega and Peri (2014); Alesina et al (2016). The 
underlying identification assumption is that the gravity predictors represent the supply-
driven component of migration. The first step to predict diversity involves relating bilateral 
migrant stocks between destination and source countries (𝑀𝑐𝑗) to bilateral distance 
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑗), the size of destination and source countries (𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑐 , 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗 , 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐 ,𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑗), the 
number of landlocked countries in each country pair (𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑐), dummy indicators 
for common ethnic and official languages, common border and past colonial ties dummies 
(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔1𝑐𝑗, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔2𝑐𝑗,𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑗), time zone differences (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑗), as well as 
interactions between the border dummy and the controls for distance, size, and being 
landlocked:14 
 
14 We compile our gravity dataset by merging data from CEPII (available at: http://www.cepii.fr) and the bilateral 
matrices of migrant stocks from Özden et al. (2011). 
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ln (𝑀𝑐𝑗) = 𝛾1𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑗+ 𝛾2𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑐 +𝛾3𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗 + 𝛾4𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐 +𝛾5𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑗+𝛾6𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑐 +𝛾7𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑗 + 𝛾8𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔1𝑐𝑗 +𝛾9𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑜𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔2𝑐𝑗+𝛾10𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑗 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑗 + 𝛾11𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑐 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑗 + 𝛾12𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑗+𝛾13𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑗 +𝛾14𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑗 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑗+𝛾15𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑐 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑗  + 𝛾16𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑐𝑗+𝛾17𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑗 +𝑢𝑐𝑗 (4)
 
where 𝑢𝑐𝑗 is the error term. We estimate the model with OLS as well as with the Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimators (PPML), as in Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 
However, given the limitations of the OLS approach when a dataset contains numerous 
zero value observations, as in our case, our preferred estimator is the PPML.15 
The second step entails imputing the predicted stock of immigrants by source country at 
the destination country level.16 We, then, calculate the predicted birthplace diversity using 
the predicted stocks according to the formula (1). A preliminary inspection of the 
unconditional correlation between predicted and actual diversity indicates that the 
instrument is strong (see Figure 2). Following Alesina et al. (2016), Figure 2 also plots the 
relationship between the difference in predicted and actual diversity against income per 
person. A negative correlation between these variables would signify a valid research 
design in terms of endogeneity. Reassuringly, we see that our approach predicts lower 
migrant diversity toward high-income countries than toward low-income countries. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
3 Results 
In this section, we explore the effects of immigrant diversity on the amount of productive 
knowledge and capabilities, as measured by the Economic Fitness index from Tacchela et 
al. (2012), We also assess the robustness of the main findings along the following lines: (i) 
using different estimation techniques, (ii) using alternative measures for the level of host 
 
15 Notice, that we refrain from introducing destination fixed effects in the gravity equation, to avoid a potential violation 
of the exclusion restriction assumption. 
16 In particular, letting Z and 𝛽 to denote the vectors of right-hand-side regressors and the coefficients in equation (4), 
the linear (OLS) gravity predictor is given by: 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡̂ = (∑ exp  (ln (𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑖≠𝑗 𝛽)̂)∑ exp  (ln (𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑖≠𝑗 𝛽)̂+ 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖 . 
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countries’ complexity, institutional quality, and openness to trade, (iii) introducing further 
contemporaneous and historical controls, (iv) performing heterogeneity tests.  
3.1 OLS estimates 
Table 2 contains our OLS estimates using equation (3) and standard errors clustered at the 
country level. We add controls gradually, as in Alesina et al. (2016), beginning in column 
(1) with a parsimonious regression of Fitness on migrant diversity and the immigrant share. 
Next, column (2) introduces continent and year dummies to account for area-specific 
heterogeneity and common temporal-specific shocks. Specification (3) includes only 
exogenous and semi-exogenous variables, related to geography and the disease/climate 
environment. In column (4) we add potential confounders that may explain simultaneously 
the trends in Economic Fitness and immigrant diversity, namely income per capita, 
openness to trade, total population, and an indicator for energy net exporters. Specification 
(5) introduces dummies for former British and French colonies to account for the influence 
of European colonization on comparative Economic Fitness, whereas the last column 
displays the results from the full specification. Importantly, the additional controls in 
columns improve the fit of the model substantially, as the R2 increases from 0.048 to 0.675 
between the columns (1) and (6). We find, through specifications, that immigrant diversity 
has a positive and significant effect on Economic Fitness at the one percent significance 
level. By contrast, the coefficient on the immigrant share variable is smaller in magnitude 
and usually statistically insignificant. Notably, these estimates are very close to the ones 
reported in Bahar et al. (2020). Notice, also, that GDP per capita and population are 
strongly positively correlated with the Fitness, metric, whereas, being an energy -rich 
country reduces economic performance. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.2 2SLS estimates 
Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, migrants tend to sort into regions that offer better 
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opportunities, and thus the estimates displayed above might not be interpreted as causal. If 
complex economies attract migrants from all over the world, we would expect the OLS 
estimate of immigrant diversity to be upwardly biased. We cannot also rule out the 
possibility of attenuation bias due to measurement errors. To address these concerns, we 
re-estimate equation (3) using an instrumental variables approach. However, before we 
proceed to the second-stage findings, it is important to briefly discuss the results obtained 
from the pseudo-gravity equation (4), which are then used to generate predicted immigrant 
diversity. We use both the OLS and the PPML estimator, clustering the standard errors at 
the country pair level. The results are generally quite consistent between specifications, 
though the fit of the PPML regression is higher. Most of the findings are significant and 
compatible with our expectations. Specifically, bilateral distance, country size, common 
language, and past colonial ties are positively correlated with migration. Based on this 
evidence, as well as on the predictive power of the resulting instrumental variables in the 
first-stage regressions, we opt to build our instrument, relying on the PPML specification.17 
According to the first-stage results (not reported for brevity available through request), the 
gravity-based instrument appears to be strongly correlated with the actual immigrant 
diversity. What is more, the Kleibergen–Paap first-stage statistics, which are reported at 
the bottom of the remaining Tables, suggest that the estimated parameters of interest are 
unlikely to suffer from weak identification issues. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 presents the second-stage estimates, along with the associated cluster-robust 
standard errors. We start with our baseline IV specification which reveals that an increase 
in immigrant diversity is associated with higher levels of productive capabilities. Notice, 
however, that the coefficient on immigrant diversity is much larger in magnitude as 
compared to the full specification estimate in Table 3. Specifically, a standard deviation 
 
17 When using the gravity-based linear predictors as instruments, the second-stage coefficients on the immigrant diversity 
variable remain qualitatively similar to the ones shown in the main text but are less precisely estimated.  
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increase in migrant diversity increases Economic Fitness by about 0.4 standard deviations. 
Next, we pay attention to potential endogeneity issues concerning the immigrant share 
variable. A natural solution would have been to use the linear gravity-based predictors as 
an instrumental variable in our 2SLS estimation strategy. However, it was not possible 
from the data available to generate a strong instrument for the fraction of migrants.  We, 
therefore, adopt an alternative approach, by employing a standard Bartik (1991) shift-share 
instrument. To that aim, we interact the share of migrants from country j in country c (in 
the base year 1980) with the total number of migrants from country j (in years 2000 and 
2010).18 Instrumenting the immigrant share variable with shift-share predicted migration, 
but not immigrant diversity with the gravity-predictor, we, once again, find that the effect 
of the immigrant share is statistically insignificant. Lastly, column (3) instruments both the 
immigrant diversity and the fraction of migrants. The statistical patterns that emerge from 
this empirical exercise reinforce our prior conclusion that it is migrant diversity that matters 
for economic complexity, rather than the size of the immigrant population.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
3.3 Robustness 
In Figure 3, we deal with concerns related to influential observations, based on a leverage-
versus-squared-residual plot. The upper part of this figure suggests that countries 11, 12, 
175, 176 have larger-than-average residuals. We also observe that country 59 has higher-
than-average leverage. We, therefore, remove these from the sample and re-estimate our 
baseline IV model. The bottom part of Figure 3 plots the second-stage estimate after this 
amendment. Notably, we once again observe a quite strong effect of diversity on Economic 
 
18 Specifically, we apply the following formula: 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑗𝑡̂ = 𝜙𝑐𝑗 ,1980×𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑠,𝑗𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 , where 𝜙𝑐𝑗,1980 is the 1980 share of 
immigrant population from country j in country c, and 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠,𝑗𝑡 is the total number of immigrants from country c 
and year t. We aggregate immigrants into 22 broad origin groups, namely Australia and New Zealand, Caribbean, Central 
America, Central Asia, Eastern Africa, Eastern Asia, Melanesia, Eastern Europe, Micronesia, Middle Africa, Northern 
Africa, Northern America, Northern Europe, Polynesia, South America, South -Eastern, Asia Southern, Africa, Southern 
Asia, Southern Europe, Western Africa, Western Asia, Western Europe.  
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Fitness. The correlation coefficient is about 0.45 whereas the associated t-statistic indicates 
significance at the one percent level. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Thus far, we have controlled for the influence of institutions implicitly through 
exogenous geographic indicators such as distance from the equator. We have also used 
trade openness from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank . In 
Table 5 we employ an alternative approach to verify our prior results, by controlling 
directly for the effects of institutional environment on comparative Fitness as well as by 
considering alternative measures for openness. In particular, we use the revised combined 
polity2 scores from the Polity IV project and the average value of the six indicators of 
governance from WGI as direct measures of institutions. The polity2 index captures the 
level of democracy and lies within the range of -10 to +10. The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators take values between -2.7 and 2.1 with higher values indicating better 
institutional performance.19 Notably, the regressions reported in columns (1) and (2) 
suggest that the correlation between Fitness and migrant diversity remains positive and 
statistically significant despite these modifications. Specification (3) adds average years of 
schooling in population above 25 years old. In Column (4) we consider “real openness” as 
suggested by Alcalá and Ciccone, (2004), calculated by normalizing the sum of imports 
and exports by the PPP GDP, using data from PWT.20 Column (5) measures openness by 
the KOF globalization indicator, whereas column (6) takes account of early development 
by using population density in 1500CE as a proxy for it. As we observe, the results remain 
qualitatively similar to the ones we found in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In Table 6 we report a set of additional estimates by using data for immigration from 
 
19 More precisely, our WGI metric is the average value of the following subindices: voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption 
20 However, Rodrik et al. (2004) dispute whether real openness is superior to the conventional measure of trade.  
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Artuc al. (2015). These authors have compiled migration data disaggregated by skill for 
the the years 1990 and 2000. Hence, this permits us to study whether the effects of 
immigration are skill-specific. As discussed in Borjas (2019) and Docquier et al. (2020), 
highly educated migrant flows may generate more complementarities and greater economic 
gains than their less-educated counterparts. Column (1) uses the diversity among all 
immigrants from these data, whereas columns (2) and (3) use diversity indicators for 
college and non-college migrants, respectively. Each of these specifications also uses skill-
specific migrant shares. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from instrumenting the 
immigrant share with the shift-share predictor. Hence, the coefficients on the immigrant 
share variable must be interpreted with caution. Importantly, we find that the estimate on 
general migrant diversity is qualitatively similar (though slightly stronger) to the results we 
found in Table 4. On the other hand, similar to Bahar et al. (2020), but unlike Docquier et 
al. (2020), the estimated coefficients on the skill-specific indicators are quite similar, 
indicating that migrants help economic performance irrespective of their level of education. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Next, we re-estimate our empirical model by using the ArCo index of technological 
progress from Archibugi and Cooco (2004) as the dependent variable, instead of the Fitness 
metric. This measure captures information on patents, scientific articles, internet 
penetration, electricity consumption, tertiary science and engineering enrollment, average 
years of schooling and literacy rates. The first column in Table 7 uses general migrant 
diversity from Özden et al. (2011) whereas in the remaining regressions we employ data 
from Artuc et al. (2015). Interestingly, the coefficient on migrant diversity remains positive 
across specifications, though we lose significance in specifications (1) and (3). Overall, the 
estimates from Table 7 confirm that migrants influence a country’s productive structure 
even when we use an alternative proxy for it.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
15  
3.4 Heterogeneous effects 
Before concluding this paper, we perform a heterogeneity test in order to understand 
whether the level of development in the receiving economies matters in explaining the 
relationship between migration and Fitness. Hence, we divide the sample into three equally 
sized groups according to the level of income per person in 1995. Following the standard 
practice in the literature, we do so by introducing interaction terms between diversity and 
dummy variables indicating the level of development. We also interact the PPML 
instrument with these indicators. Figure 3 plots the second-stage estimates along with the 
95 percent intervals from this empirical exercise. Interestingly, we find that the impact of 
birthplace diversity is stronger and statistically significant for middle-income countries. In 
contrast, no significant effects can be identified for the remaining groups of countries. 
Similar results are also found by Bahar et al. (2020) where economies at the middle tercile 
of economic complexity appear to gain more by diversity.  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
3.5 Panel data, 2SLS evidence  
Despite our main cross-sectional analysis is based on a rich set of explanatory variables, 
there is still room for omitted confounding that might render the inference invalid. In this 
section, we re-estimate our empirical model using the latest United Nations Migrant Stock 
Data21 over the period 1990-2010, which are available in 5-year intervals. We also use 
predicted diversity as a source of exogenous variation, obtained from a gravity model in 
the spirit of Feyrer (2019) that is suitable for panel settings. The essence of Feyrer’s 
approach lies in the use of interactions between distance and year dummies, in order to 
generate gravity predictors that vary with time.22 The interaction terms are intended to 
 
21 We have downloaded the data using the package untools in R, available at: https://dante-sttr.gitlab.io/un-
tools/index.html 
22 This method was originally proposed to estimate the causal effects of trade on income. For some applications with 
time-varying gravity instruments within the migration context, see, Valette (2018); Docquier et al. (2020). 
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capture the effects of country-specific transportation costs on cross-border movements. 
Keeping these issues in mind, we estimate a panel gravity equation which is identical to 
the one used in Valette (2018). In particular, bilateral migrant stocks are regressed on 
distance, common language and past colonial ties indicators, and distance by year 
interactions. Our model also includes year and country of origin fixed effects. The “zero-
stage” results, are shown in the Appendix Table A. 
Table 8 presents two sets of empirical estimates, based on the specification which 
considers interactions between migrant diversity and income terciles, similar to the ones 
we reported in Figure 4, using a cross-section design. The estimated equations include only 
time-varying controls, namely gdp per capita, average years of schooling, trade openness, 
and total population. The top part considers OLS regressions that include year and country 
fixed effects. Importantly, accounting for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity yields 
quite robust results that are consistent with those we found earlier, with one exception. 
Specifically, migrant diversity enhances economic performance into middle income host 
countries. There is, however, a strong negative effect on low-income countries.  
The bottom part of Table 8 presents the second-stage estimates from this important 
empirical exercise. The general pattern that emerges from panel B is that, once again, 
migrant diversity mostly affects countries at the middle tercile. The estimated effects, 
however, appear to be weaker in terms of statistical significance. On the other hand, the 
impact on countries that belong to the lowest income tercile ceases to be significant and 
also becomes positive once we control for population, trade openness and schooling.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
4. Conclusions 
 
Recent studies have shown that economic complexity is a key factor for economic 
development. This article considers the question of whether migrants influence 
complexity, as measured by the Economic Fitness indicator from Tacchela et al. (2012). 
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Using a cross-section of developed and developing countries, and gravity predictors of 
bilateral migrations to address the usual endogeneity and measurement error concerns, we 
have shown that higher migrant diversity is correlated with higher levels of Fitness. 
Encouragingly, this finding appears to be robust in a series of sensitivity tests, including, 
among others, immigration data from external sources, an alternative dependent variable  
from Archibugi and Coco (2004), and an extensive set of controls. Interestingly, however, 
this pattern appears to differ according to the host country’s level of development. In 
particular, we find that immigration generates gains for middle-income countries whereas 
the effects on rich and poor economies appear to be negligible.  
The current findings add to the growing body of cross-sectional studies on the nexus 
between immigration and economic performance. This paper has focused on the Fitness of 
countries, providing pieces of evidence in support of earlier findings, and in particular, 
those reported in Alesina et al. (2016) and Bahar et al. (2020).  
Nevertheless, we improve on previous studies by using conventional panel data methods 
to account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. We consistently detect 
qualitatively similar results once we replicate the main analysis, combining the approach 
introduced by Feyrer (2019), to generate a time-varying instrument, with data in 5-year 
intervals over the period 1990-2010 from the United Nations Migrant Stocks. We establish 
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Table 1 Summary statistics of the main variables 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max Source 
 Economic Fitness 258 1.083 1.682 0 10.273 World Bank, Tacchela et al. (2012) 
 ArCo 258 .312 .189 .017 .867 Archibugi and Coco (2004) 
 Birthplace diversity 258 .726 .196 .03 .965 Own calculations, World Bank, Özden et al. (2011) 
 PPML instrument 258 .871 .126 .226 .98 Own calculations, Özden et al. (2011), BACI dataset 
 Immigrant share 258 7.611 12.171 .036 77.616 World Bank, Özden et al. (2011) 
 Bartik instrument 258 5.674 9.059 .006 76.811 Own calculations, World Bank, Özden et al. (2011) 
 Distance from equator 258 27.762 18.116 .422 67.47 Ortega and Peri (2014) 
 Landlocked 258 .24 .428 0 1 Ortega and Peri (2014) 
 Distance to nearest coast 258 .4 .438 .003 2.206 Nunn and Puga (2012) 
 Pct. tropic land 258 31.743 41.514 0 100 Nunn and Puga (2012) 
 Malaria indicator 258 .29 .4 0 .95 Ortega and Peri (2014) 
 Yellow fever indicator 258 .434 .497 0 1 Ortega and Peri (2014) 
 Average temperature 258 17.687 8.724 -7.929 28.639 Ashraf and Galor (2013) 
 Average precipitation 258 84.713 59.355 2.911 241.718 Ashraf and Galor (2013) 
 Land area 258 967000 2280000 646 1.71e+07 Nunn and Puga (2012) 
 GDP/capita, PPP 258 10757.57 13233.63 169.098 87399.84 PWT 
 Trade openness 258 80.464 49.173 2.008 442.475 PWT 
 Population 258 4.48e+07 1.47e+08 267000 1.30e+09 World Development Indicators 
 Oil/gas exporter 258 .341 .475 0 1 The QoG Institute, University of Gothenburg 
 Polity2 254 2.937 6.697 -10 10 Polity IV Project 
 WGI instq 258 -.089 .957 -2.1 1.894 World Governance Indicators 
 Average years of schooling 250 6.765 3.52 .11 12.86 Wittgenstein Centre Human Capital Data Explorer 
 Real openness 258 49.031 41.962 .889 326.267 PWT 
 KOF Globalization index 258 54.47 16.556 21.552 88.022 KOF Swiss Economic Institute 
Population density in 1500 256 6.26 8.957 .022 46.639 Ashraf and Galor (2013) 
 Former British colony 258 .248 .433 0 1 Nunn and Puga (2012) 








Figure 1 Economic Fitness and birthplace diversity among immigrants. Authors’ elaborations on Tacchela et 





Figure 2 Unconditional correlations: actual migrant diversity versus gravity-predicted instrument (left), 




Table 2 Gravity Estimates of Bilateral Migrations (“Zero-stage”) 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: Bilateral migrant stock OLS PPML 
      
Distance -1.401*** -1.586*** 
 
(0.140) (0.120) 
Population, destination 0.311*** 0.319** 
 
(0.0879) (0.146) 
Population, origin 0.123 0.548*** 
 
(0.134) (0.101) 
Area, destination 0.111 0.424*** 
 
(0.0840) (0.143) 
Area, origin 0.0768* 0.161* 
 
(0.0390) (0.0843) 
Sum landlocked -0.483* -0.622** 
 
(0.260) (0.259) 
Border 4.442 -2.983** 
 
(3.653) (1.498) 
Border * Population, destination -0.198 0.395*** 
 
(0.247) (0.144) 
Border * Population, origin 0.181 -0.260** 
 
(0.165) (0.110) 
Border * Area, destination 0.308 -0.451** 
 
(0.190) (0.197) 
Border * Area, origin 0.185 0.276* 
 
(0.166) (0.147) 
Border * Distance -1.250*** 0.475 
 
(0.478) (0.418) 
Border * landlocked 0.372 0.472** 
 
(0.323) (0.204) 
Common language 0.948*** 1.554*** 
 
(0.248) (0.492) 
Common official language 0.304* 0.0210 
 
(0.158) (0.467) 
Colonial relationship 2.445*** 1.568*** 
 
(0.212) (0.242) 
Time zone differences 0.244* 0.148*** 
 
(0.129) (0.0301) 






Observations 34,120 88,620 
R-squared 0.363 0.580 
This table presents OLS and PPML estimates using data for the years 1990 and 2000, obtained from the 
World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration Database and CEPII. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Immigration and economic performance, OLS estimates 















       
Birthplace  0.235*** 0.209*** 0.232*** 0.122*** 0.203*** 0.171*** 
diversity (0.077) (0.063) (0.065) (0.047) (0.063) (0.047) 
Immigrant  -0.004 -0.105* 0.017 -0.094 -0.132** -0.068 
share (0.064) (0.060) (0.068) (0.063) (0.059) (0.056) 
Distance to    -0.004   0.004 
equator   (0.012)   (0.009) 
Landlocked   0.077   0.265 
   (0.217)   (0.170) 
Distance to    -0.494*   -0.042 
coast   (0.261)   (0.200) 
Pct. tropic    -0.007**   -0.005** 
land   (0.003)   (0.003) 
Malaria    -0.555***   0.484** 
     (0.188)   (0.213) 
Yellow fever    0.369   0.278* 
   (0.291)   (0.167) 
Mean    -0.022   -0.016 
temperature   (0.017)   (0.014) 
Mean    0.006**   0.003* 
precipitation   (0.002)   (0.002) 
Area (Log)   0.153**   -0.168*** 
   (0.061)   (0.049) 
GDP/capita,     0.416***  0.471*** 
PPP (Log)    (0.084)  (0.079) 
Trade     -0.023  -0.028 
openness    (0.077)  (0.081) 
Population     0.285***  0.425*** 
(Log)    (0.055)  (0.068) 
Oil/gas     -0.525***  -0.321*** 
exporter    (0.125)  (0.119) 
Former British      0.209 -0.064 
colony     (0.237) (0.142) 
Former French      0.043 0.068 
colony     (0.161) (0.151) 
Continent FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 258 258 258 258 258 258 
# Countries 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.337 0.408 0.627 0.337 0.675 
This table presents pooled OLS estimates using data for the years 1990 and 2000. Except otherwise specified, 
each specification includes broad region dummies, namely, Europe, Americas, Asia, and Oceania (omitted 




Table 4. Immigration and economic performance, Second-stage estimates 
Dependent variable: economic fitness (1) (2)  (3) 
Birthplace Diversity 0.396** 0.172*** 0.388**  
(0.187) (0.048) (0.178) 
Immigrant share -0.076 -0.097 -0.114  
(0.060) (0.114) (0.130) 
Distance to equator 0.007 0.004 0.006  
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
Landlocked 0.219 0.261 0.214  
(0.188) (0.171) (0.188) 
Distance to coast 0.060 -0.029 0.074  
(0.240) (0.202) (0.243) 
Pct. tropic land -0.007** -0.005* -0.007**  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Malaria indicator 0.290 0.480** 0.293  
(0.287) (0.215) (0.285) 
Yellow fever indicator 0.388* 0.285* 0.393*  
(0.208) (0.169) (0.209) 
Mean temperature -0.011 -0.015 -0.011  
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) 
Mean precipitation 0.005* 0.002 0.004*  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Area (Log) -0.192*** -0.173*** -0.197***  
(0.054) (0.049) (0.055) 
GDP/capita, PPP (Log)  0.406*** 0.485*** 0.428***  
(0.098) (0.090) (0.104) 
Trade openness -0.048 -0.030 -0.050  
(0.090) (0.082) (0.091) 
Population (Log) 0.424*** 0.420*** 0.418***  
(0.072) (0.071) (0.075) 
Oil/gas exporter -0.317** -0.322*** -0.318**  
(0.134) (0.120) (0.134) 
Former British colony -0.085 -0.049 -0.065  
(0.155) (0.150) (0.163) 
Former French colony 0.116 0.070 0.118  
(0.189) (0.151) (0.187) 








Observations 258 258 258 
# Countries 129 129 129 
Adjusted R-squared 0.638 0.675 0.641 
Instruments: PPML   PPML  
     Bartik Bartik 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Test 14.08 18.38 7.543 
This table presents 2SLS estimates using data for the years 1990 and 2000. Except otherwise specified, each 
specification includes broad region dummies, namely, Europe, Americas, Asia, and Oceania (omitted 



























Table 5. Immigration and economic performance, institutions, human capital and 
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alternative measures of openness, Second-stage estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: economic fitness     
             
Birthplace diversity 0.443** 0.340* 0.429** 0.389** 0.412* 0.397**  
(0.203) (0.194) (0.208) (0.188) (0.236) (0.156) 
Immigrant share -0.157 -0.092 -0.098 -0.110 -0.116 0.072  
(0.147) (0.127) (0.132) (0.126) (0.137) (0.118) 
Polity2 -0.005     
 
 
(0.013)     
 
WGI Instq  
 0.143    
 
 
 (0.132)    
 
Schooling (years) 
  -0.064   
 
 
  (0.126)   
 
Real trade openness 
   0.035  
 
 
   (0.083)  
 
KOF globalization 
    -0.004 
 
 
    (0.012) 
 
Pop density in 1500      0.050*** 
      (0.007) 
       
Geography, disease controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GDP, Trade, Population, Oil Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continent FE, colonial history Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 254 258 250 258 258 256 
# Countries 127 129 125 129 129 128 
Adjusted R-squared 0.625 0.656 0.631 0.640 0.633 0.740 
Instruments: PPML  PPML  PPML  PPML  PPML  PPML  
 Bartik Bartik Bartik Bartik Bartik Bartik 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Test 5.135 5.976 6.601 6.965 3.730 8.055 
This table presents 2SLS estimates using data for the years 1990 and 2000. Except otherwise specified, each 
specification includes broad region dummies, namely, Europe, Americas, Asia, and Oceania (omitted 




Table 6. Immigration and economic performance, Second-stage estimates by skill level 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: economic fitness    
        
Birthplace diversity (all immigrants) 0.411***    
(0.142)   
Immigrant share (all immigrants) 0.014    
(0.064)   
Birthplace diversity (skilled immigrants) 
 0.381*   
 (0.195)  
Immigrant share (skilled immigrants) 
 0.005   
 (0.076)  
Birthplace diversity (unskilled immigrants) 
  0.344**  
  (0.135) 
Immigrant share (unskilled immigrants) 
  0.007  
  (0.055)  
   
Geography and disease controls YES YES YES 
GDP/capita Trade Population Oil YES YES YES 
Continent FE colonial history YES YES YES 
Observations 258 258 258 
# Countries 129 129 129 
Adjusted R-squared 0.623 0.652 0.639 
Instruments: PPML PPML PPML 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Test 17.99 13.45 16.30 
This table presents 2SLS estimates using data for the years 1990 and 2000. Immigration data disaggregated 
by skill level are obtained from Artuc et al. (2015). Except otherwise specified, each specification includes 
broad region dummies, namely, Europe, Americas, Asia, and Oceania (omitted category: Africa). Robust 




Table 7. Alternative measure of economic complexity , 2SLS estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Arco Technological Capabilities 
          
Birthplace diversity (all immigrants) 0.107 0.174**    
(0.097) (0.070)   
 
Immigrant share (all immigrants) 0.002 0.050    
(0.004) (0.047)   
Birthplace diversity (skilled immigrants) 
 
 0.100    
 (0.098)  
Immigrant share (skilled immigrants) 
 
 0.109**    
 (0.055)  
Birthplace diversity (unskilled immigrants) 
 
  0.166**   
  (0.070) 
Immigrant share (unskilled immigrants) 
 
  0.030   
  (0.043)    
Observations 258 258 258 258 
Adjusted R-squared 0.878 0.886 0.883 0.883 
Geography and disease controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GDP/capita Trade Population Oil Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continent FE colonial history Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Test 14.08 17.99 13.45 16.30 
This table presents 2SLS estimates using data for the years 1990 and 2000. The first column uses immigration 
data obtained from Özden et al. (2011). Columns 2 to 4 use immigration data obtained from Artuc et al. 
(2015). Except otherwise specified, each specification includes broad region dummies, namely, Europe, 
Americas, Asia, and Oceania (omitted category: Africa). Robust standard errors, clustered by country. *** 





Figure 4 Second-stage estimates on the effect of migrant diversity on Economic Fitness according to the 
receiving countries’ level of economic development.
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Table 8. Immigration and economic performance, panel data estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
[A] OLS estimates      
Birthplace Diversity * bottom tercile -0.200*** -0.279*** -0.227*** -0.236*** -0.226*** 
 (0.068) (0.070) (0.072) (0.075) (0.077) 
Birthplace Diversity * middle tercile 0.057** 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Birthplace Diversity * top tercile 0.029 0.044 0.044 0.038 0.061 
 (0.049) (0.038) (0.040) (0.037) (0.042) 
Immigrant share -0.017** -0.015** -0.018** -0.018** -0.015** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP/capita, PPP (Log)  0.381* 0.408* 0.409* 0.422* 
  (0.220) (0.221) (0.220) (0.225) 
Population (Log)   0.319** 0.324** 0.215 
   (0.144) (0.143) (0.133) 
Trade openness    0.084* 0.087 
    (0.049) (0.055) 
Schooling (years)     0.234 
     (0.146) 
Observations 642 630 630 630 611 
# Countries 129 129 129 129 125 
[B] 2SLS estimates      
Birthplace Diversity * bottom tercile -0.071 -0.200 0.084 0.113 0.109 
 (0.160) (0.250) (0.332) (0.327) (0.317) 
Birthplace Diversity * middle tercile 0.054 0.099** 0.108 0.112 0.195* 
 (0.078) (0.047) (0.072) (0.076) (0.109) 
Birthplace Diversity * top tercile -0.016 -0.108 0.013 0.016 0.433 
 (0.074) (0.120) (0.103) (0.100) (0.351) 
Immigrant share -0.018** -0.020** -0.019** -0.020** -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) 
GDP/capita, PPP (Log)  0.363 0.383* 0.381* 0.425* 
  (0.232) (0.230) (0.229) (0.223) 
Population (Log)   0.426* 0.443** 0.195 
   (0.226) (0.220) (0.179) 
Trade openness    0.065 0.006 
    (0.065) (0.100) 
Schooling (years)     0.473* 
     (0.283) 
      
Observations 642 630 630 630 611 
# Countries 129 129 129 129 125 
This table presents OLS and 2SLS estimates using panel data for the period 1990-2010. Immigration data are 






Table A1 List of Countries 
    
 Afghanistan  Ghana  Oman 
 Algeria   Greece  Pakistan  
 Angola  Guatemala  Panama 
 Argentina   Guinea  Paraguay 
 Armenia  Guinea-Bissau  Peru 
 Australia   Guyana  Philippines 
 Austria   Honduras  Poland 
 Azerbaijan  Hungary  Portugal 
 Bangladesh  Iceland  Qatar 
 Belarus  India   Russia  
 Belgium  Indonesia  Rwanda 
 Benin  Iran  Saudi Arabia 
 Bhutan  Iraq  Senegal 
 Bolivia   Ireland  Sierra Leone 
 Brazil  Israel  Singapore 
 Bulgaria   Italy  Slovakia 
 Burkina Faso  Japan  Slovenia  
 Burundi  Jordan  Somalia 
 Cameroon  Kazakhstan  South Africa 
 Canada  Kenya  Spain 
 Central African Republic  Korea, South  Suriname 
 Chad  Kuwait  Sweden 
 Chile  Kyrgyzstan  Switzerland 
 China  Laos  Syria  
 Colombia  Latvia  Tajikistan 
 Congo  Libya  Tanzania 
 Costa Rica  Lithuania  Thailand 
 Cote d'Ivoire  Madagascar  Togo 
 Croatia  Malawi  Tunisia  
 Czech Republic  Malaysia   Turkey 
 Denmark  Mali  Turkmenistan 
 Ecuador  Mauritania  Uganda 
 Egypt  Mexico  Ukraine 
 El Salvador  Mongolia   United Arab Emirates 
 Eritrea  Morocco  United Kingdom 
 Estonia   Mozambique  United States 
 Ethiopia   Nepal  Uruguay 
 Finland  Netherlands  Uzbekistan 
 France   New Zealand  Venezuela 
 Gabon  Nicaragua  Vietnam 
 Gambia  Niger  Yemen 
 Georgia   Nigeria   Zambia 





Figure A1 Nonparametric relationship between Economic Fitness and income per person. Authors’ 













Table A2. Gravity estimates, 1990-2010 
Dependent variable: Bilateral Migrant Stocks (1) 
Border 2.247*** 
 (0.213) 
Common language 0.956** 
 (0.388) 
Common official language 0.455* 
 (0.275) 
Colonial relationship 2.359*** 
 (0.437) 
Distance * I(1990) -0.703*** 
 (0.162) 
Distance * I(1995) -0.732*** 
 (0.163) 
Distance * I(2000) -0.700*** 
 (0.164) 
Distance * I(2005) -0.706*** 
 (0.166) 
Distance * I(2010) -0.707*** 
Observations 51,127 
R-squared 0.350 
This table presents OLS estimates using panel data for the period 1990-2010. Immigration data are obtained 
from United Nations Migrant Stocks. Robust standard errors, clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
